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In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling suggested in an influential article in the Atlan-
tic Monthly that targeting minor disorder could help reduce more serious crime. More than twenty
years later, the three most populous cities in the United States-New York, Chicago, and, most
recently, Los Angeles-have all adopted at least some aspect of Wilson and Kelling's theory, pri-
marily through more aggressive enforcement of minor misdemeanor laws. Remarkably little,
though, is currently known about the effect of broken windows policing on crime.
According to a recent National Research Council report, existing research does not provide
strong support for the broken windows hypothesis-with the possible exception of a 2001 study of
crime trends in New York City by George Kelling and William Sousa.
In this Article, we reexamine the 2001 Kelling and Sousa study and independently analyze
the crime data from New York City for the 1989-1998 period. In addition, we present results from
an important social experiment known as Moving to Opportunity (MTO) underway in five cities,
including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, as well as Baltimore and Boston, that provides a
unique opportunity to overcome some of the problems with previous empirical tests of the broken
windows hypothesis. Under this program, approximately 4,600 low-income families living in high-
crime public housing communities characterized by high rates of social disorder were randomly
assigned housing vouchers to move to less disadvantaged and disorderly communities.
Taken together, the evidence from New York City and from the five-city social experiment
provides no support for a simple first-order disorder-crime relationship as hypothesized by Wilson
and Kelling, nor for the proposition that broken windows policing is the optimal use of scarce law
enforcement resources.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling suggested in an
influential article in the Atlantic Monthly that targeting minor disor-
der-loitering, panhandling, prostitution, graffiti-could help reduce
more serious crime.' The "broken windows" theory produced what
many observers have called a revolution in policing and law enforce-
ment.2 Today, the three most populous cities in the United States-
New York, Chicago, and, most recently, Los Angeles-have all adopted
at least some aspect of Wilson and Kelling's broken windows theory,
primarily through more aggressive enforcement of minor misde-
meanor laws, also known as "order maintenance" policing.'
Despite the widespread policy influence of Wilson and Kelling's
1982 Atlantic Monthly essay, remarkably little is known about the ef-
fects of broken windows. A number of leading researchers in sociol-
ogy, law, and police studies-including Wesley Skogan at Northwest-
ern, Robert Sampson at Harvard, Stephen Raudenbush at The Uni-
versity of Chicago, Anthony Braga at Harvard, and Jeffrey Fagan at
Columbia, among others-have compiled datasets from different ur-
ban areas to explore the broken windows hypothesis, but the evidence
remains, at best, mixed. In 2000, John Eck and Edward Maguire re-
1 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, Atlantic Monthly 29, 38 (Mar 1982) (arguing that a correlation exists between law en-
forcement's failure to control certain types of "quality of life" crimes, such as loitering, public
drunkenness, and vandalism, and the increased likelihood that violent crimes, such as robbery,
will occur).
2 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows
Policing 46 (Harvard 2001), citing Michael Massing, The Blue Revolution, NY Rev of Books 32
(Nov 19,1998).
3 Then New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani first embraced quality-of-life policing in
the mid 1990s, at a time when high crime rates began declining impressively in the city. Mayor
Giuliani and his first police commissioner, William Bratton, traced their quality-of-life initiative
directly back to the Wilson and Kelling essay. See New York City Police Department, Police
Strategy No 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York 6 (1994). The City of Chicago imple-
mented an anti-gang loitering ordinance in the early 1990s that it vigorously enforced during the
1993-1995 period resulting in misdemeanor arrests of more than 42,000 individuals See City of
Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 49 (1999). In October 2002, Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn
appointed William Bratton police commissioner on a platform that promised a broken windows
approach. According to news reports, "Mr. Bratton said his first priority after being sworn in on
[October 28,2002,] would be ending the smile-and-wave approach to crime fighting. He said he
wanted policing based on the so-called broken-windows theory." Charlie LeDuff, Los Angeles
Police Chief Faces a Huge Challenge, NY Times A22 (Oct 24, 2002). See also Megan Garvey,
Bratton Is Planning a Clean Start; The Police Chief Who Will Be Sworn in Today, Sees Fighting
Graffiti as Key to Reducing Crime, LA Times Metro 1 (Oct 25, 2002) ("Far from trivial, Bratton
said, fighting graffiti is the key to reducing crime overall and solving more serious offenses-
from drug dealing to murder."); Tina Daunt and Megan Garvey, Bratton Lays out Ambitious Set
of Goals for LA PD, LA Times Metro 1 (Oct 4, 2002) (reporting that Bratton identifies tackling
the graffiti problem facing Los Angeles as one of his first orders of business "because it reflects
community pride").
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viewed the empirical evidence and studies on broken windows polic-
ing in their contribution to Alfred Blumstein's The Crime Drop in
America, and found that there is little evidence to support the claim
that broken windows policing contributed to the sharp decrease in
crime during the 1990s.'
However, a recent report by a blue-ribbon panel commissioned
by the National Research Council (NRC) - which is itself part of the
National Academies of Science, chartered in 1863 by Congress to ad-
vise the federal government on scientific matters-suggests that there
may be new evidence that supports the broken windows theory.5 The
NRC notes that:
There is a widespread perception among police policy makers
and the public that enforcement strategies (primarily arrest) ap-
plied broadly against offenders committing minor offenses lead
to reductions in serious crime. Research does not provide strong
support for this proposition.
A recent study of New York [City] precincts, however, indicates a
strong relationship between the rate of arrests for minor crimes
and crime rates in precincts in New York (Kelling and Sousa,
2001). Using a multilevel research design, the authors provide
one of the first indications of a direct link between a generalized
program of intensive enforcement and declines in more serious
crime. While the study uses an innovative modeling approach to
estimate this effect, limitations in the data available raise ques-
tions regarding the validity of the results.
4 John E. Eck and Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime?
An Assessment of the Evidence, in Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman, eds, The Crime Drop in
America 207, 228 (Cambridge 2000) ("Overall, the evidence is mixed on the efficacy of generic
zero-tolerance strategies in driving down rates of violent crime, though serious questions have
been raised about their effects on police-community relations."). See also Harcourt, Illusion of
Order at 88 (cited in note 2) (concluding, on the basis of existing social-scientific data, that
neighborhood disorder is not significantly related to more serious crimes when poverty, stability,
and race are held constant); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the
Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 Mich L Rev 291,389 (1998) (challenging broken windows policing by
arguing that the alleged correlation between disorder and serious crime fails to take into account
other factors that may contribute to the deterioration of a neighborhood).
5 Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frydl, eds, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evi-
dence 2 (National Academies 2004).
6 Id at 229-30 ("Moreover, in a review of the strategies employed in the New York City
program, Kelling and Souza [sic] suggest that disorder policing was often applied selectively at
the precinct level, focusing on areas of specific problems."). The report refers to a study prepared
by George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter?:An Analysis of the Impact of
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The 2001 study by George Kelling and William Sousa, titled Do
Police Matter?: An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police
Reforms, shows that aggressive misdemeanor arrest policies in New
York City account for the significant drop in crime during the mid-to-
late 1990s.7 The Kelling and Sousa report has received significant me-
dia attention. In addition to being viewed as the only promising evi-
dence by the NRC, the Economist reported on the study,8 as did the
New York Times,9 the Wall Street Journal,' and the Boston Globe,"
both of the latter in editorials, and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution.'2
For example, the Wall Street Journal's editorial page argued:
A brand new report from the indispensable Manhattan Institute
chronicles these law-and-order achievements and explains what
made them possible.
New York City's Police Reforms 18 (Manhattan Institute Center for Civic Innovation Civic Re-
port No 22, 2001) ("[D]espite the root-cause theories that have dominated criminological, crimi-
nal justice, and much popular thinking about crime control, police can have a significant effect
on crime levels in neighborhoods and communities. One singularly important way of doing this is
by restoring and maintaining order, through 'broken windows' policing.").
7 The Kelling and Sousa report was issued with a simultaneously published editorial
comment by the authors in the New York Post. "So what does all this mean?" Kelling and Sousa
ask. "First, it means that New Yorkers should stop listening to critics who contend that police
tactics matter little, if at all, in determining crime rates." These critics, the authors note, "have
been parroting what is virtual dogma in criminal-justice circles, that crime is caused by 'root
causes' such as racism, poverty and social injustice." In contrast, the authors declare, "This study
places the 'root cause' theory of crime in serious jeopardy." George L. Kelling and William H.
Sousa, Jr., Tough Cops Matter, NY Post 41 (Dec 19, 2001). The New York Post carried its own
editorial the same day. Editorial, It's the Cops, Stupid, NY Post 42 (Dec 19, 2001) ("Kelling and
his colleague William Sousa demonstrate in a new Manhattan Institute study that ... it was actu-
ally the vision, management and plain old hard work of the police that produced the city's his-
toric crime drop.").
8 New York's Mayor: Long-Running Show Closes on Broadway; New One Previews,
Economist 25 (Jan 5,2002) (citing the findings of the Manhattan Institute study in discussing the
close relationship between Mayor Giuliani's successful implementation of the broken windows
policing strategy and the decrease in the rate of violent crime in New York City).
9 Kevin Flynn, Study Says a Slumping Economy Doesn't Mean Crime Will Rise, NY Times
D8 (Dec 19, 2001) ("In fact, the researchers found that many areas of New York that had higher
unemployment in recent years actually had slightly sharper declines in crime, in part because of
innovative patrol strategies by police officers.").
10 Editorial, New York's Finest, Wall St J A12 (Dec 27, 2001) (praising Mayor Giuliani for
his role in crime reduction).
11 Editorial, Behind Giuliani's Jab, Boston Globe A14 (Dec 29, 2001) (noting that Kelling
and Sousa argue that zero-tolerance police tactics were instrumental in reducing crime, but also
raising doubts about the efficacy of the policing strategy).
12 Colin Campbell, New York a Blueprint for Cutting Atlanta Crime, Atlanta J-Const 5F
(Dec 23, 2001) (citing the Kelling and Sousa study in discussing the reasons for the decline in
New York's crime rate during the 1990s and the lessons that Atlanta should take away from the
New York experience as it addresses its rising crime rate).
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"Do Police Matter?" also does a great public service in thor-
oughly refuting those media critics and political opponents of the
Republican Mayor who've insisted for the past eight years that
the NYPD had little if anything to do with the fall in crime. In
this alternative universe, the city's drop in crime should be cred-
ited to low unemployment from a booming economy. Or the de-
cline in crack cocaine use that had plagued the 1980s. Or the
demographic reality that the proportion of young males-the most
common offenders-to the general population had dropped.
In fact, none of these alternative explanations stands up to scrutiny.'3
An even more recent paper by economists Hope Corman and
Naci Mocan applies a slightly different empirical approach to data
from New York City and claims to support the Kelling-Sousa conclu-
sion." Corman and Mocan analyze monthly time-series data for New
York City as a whole and claim that the dramatic increase in misde-
meanor arrest rates in New York during the 1990s is responsible for a
large share of the city's drop in crime over this period. So while Kel-
ling and Sousa use variation across precincts over time in misde-
meanor arrests and crime rates to identify the effects of the former on
the latter, Corman and Mocan use city-wide variation over time to
generate a similar finding. Moreover, Corman and Mocan point to
deterrence as the most plausible mechanism for this relationship,
given that misdemeanor arrests typically result in either no jail time or
short spells of incarceration." The Kelling and Sousa study, together
with the Corman and Mocan paper, are thus important contributions,
representing the best existing evidence supporting the broken win-
dows hypothesis and the related (and widespread) broken windows or
order-maintenance policing strategy.
In this Article, we set out to reanalyze and assess the best avail-
able evidence from New York City about the effects of broken win-
dows policing. Although Kelling and Sousa were unwilling to share
13 Editorial, New York's Finest, Wall St J at A12 (cited in note 10). Even Queensland's
Courier-Mail, reporting on the 2001 study, stated that "in precinct after precinct Kelling and
Sousa found a similar pattern-as 'broken windows' policing was increased, violent crime de-
clined." Ron Bruton, Broken Windows' Plan Shatters Crime Theory, Courier-Mail 24 (Queen-
sland, Australia) (Jan 5, 2002).
14 Hope Corman and Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks and Broken Windows, 48 J L & Econ 235,
262 (2005) ("A 10 percent increase in misdemeanor arrests decreases motor vehicle thefts by 1.6
to 2.1 percent, [and] robberies by 2.5 to 3.2 percent .... We do not find strong evidence to sup-
port the contention that a broken-windows policing strategy affects the other crimes.").
15 Id at 251 (noting that of the 122,797 misdemeanor arrests studied, only 9.4 percent "re-
sulted in a conviction with a jail sentence," with "an average length of stay" of 27.5 days, resulting
in an "expected jail sentence for [a] misdemeanor arrest" of about 2.6 days).
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their data with us, we were able to assemble a dataset with the same
precinct-level crime and arrest information as used in their study. We
demonstrate that the pattern of crime changes across New York pre-
cincts during the 1990s that Kelling and Sousa attribute to broken
windows policing is more consistent with what statisticians call mean
reversion: those precincts that received the most intensive broken
windows policing during the 1990s are the ones that experienced the
largest increases in crime during the city's crack epidemic of the mid-
to-late 1980s. Consistent with findings elsewhere from city-level data,
16
jurisdictions with the greatest increases in crime during the 1980s tend
to experience the largest subsequent declines as well. We call this
Newton's Law of Crime: what goes up must come down (and what
goes up the most tends to come down the most). For similar reasons
we argue that the Corman and Mocan study also is unable to deter-
mine convincingly that broken windows policing is a causal contribu-
tor to crime rates in New York City.
Because our reanalysis of the New York data leaves us with a
Scottish verdict-"not proven"-we then turn to data from a unique
randomized experiment conducted by the U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) known as Moving to Opportu-
nity (MTO), which provides a new opportunity to test the original
Wilson and Kelling broken windows thesis. MTO has been in opera-
tion since 1994 in five cities, including the three largest cities in the
country that have adopted aspects of broken windows policing (New
York, Chicago, and Los Angeles), as well as Baltimore and Boston.
Under MTO, a total of around 4,600 low-income families living in
public housing communities characterized by high rates of crime and
social disorder were randomly assigned housing vouchers to move to
less disadvantaged and disorderly communities." The random assign-
ment of families to neighborhoods in MTO helps overcome the prob-
lem of determining the causal effects of neighborhood disorder on
individual criminal behavior that plagues most previous studies in this
literature."
16 See Steven Raphael and Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of Pro-
ject Exile, in Jens Ludwig and Philip J. Cook, eds, Evaluating Gun Policy 251, 265 (Brookings
2003) (positing that the reduction in violence in such areas finds its root, not in federalized
prosecution of eligible gun offenses, but rather in the fact that the violence accompanying the
introduction of crack cocaine in the 1980s had run its course by the late 1990s).
17 See Larry Orr, et al, Moving to Opportunity: Interim Impacts Evaluation ii-iv (HUD
Office of Policy Development 2003), online at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/
MTOFullReport.pdf (visited Jan 19,2006) (describing the MTO program).
18 Because most people have at least some degree of choice over where they live and with
whom they associate, previous nonexperimental studies may confound the effects of neighbor-
hood disorder and other characteristics on people's behavior with the effects of difficult-to-
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The implications of MTO for the ongoing debates about the bro-
ken windows theory have not yet been explored.' 9 Yet the results from
MTO suggest that moving people to communities with less social or
physical disorder-the key intervening factor in the original Wilson
and Kelling broken windows hypothesis-on balance does not lead to
a reduction in their criminal behavior. It is important to note that
MTO changed multiple aspects of people's neighborhoods: MTO
families moved to neighborhoods that were less disorderly, but also
had fewer low-income families and more high-status households.
MTO thus tested the combined effects of less disorder and increased
affluence within a community, which is arguably still a policy-relevant
"treatment combination" for neighborhoods under the broken win-
dows model because reductions in disorder, like other improvements
in neighborhood amenities, should on average translate into increased
neighborhood gentrification.
Taken together our examination of data from New York City and
MTO provide no support for the idea that broken windows enforce-
ment activities, including order-maintenance policing or other meas-
ures designed to reduce the level of social or physical disorder within
a community, represent the optimal use of scarce government resources.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I locates the broken
windows theory within sociological and policy traditions, and reviews
preceding efforts to test the broken windows theory and the practice
of broken windows policing. Part II then presents our discussion of the
evidence from New York City. Part III presents our findings from the
MTO experiment, demonstrating that randomly assigning people to
move to less disorderly communities does not yield the simple "less
disorder, less criminal activity" result that broken windows policing
predicts.
measure individual attributes that influence both their involvement with crime and their choice
of residential neighborhood.
19 While recent results of studies on neighborhood effects on criminal behavior have been
published in the field of economics, these findings are currently not widely known outside of that
discipline and, as a result, their implications for broken windows have never been explored. See
Jeffrey R. Kling, Jens Ludwig, and Lawrence F Katz, Neighborhood Effects on Crime for Female
and Male Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment, 120 Q J Econ 87,87
(2005) (concluding that the effects of MTO programs on the propensity of a youth to become
involved in some form of violent or property crime depends, to an extent, on the differences in
how male and female youths adapt and respond to similar new neighborhood environments).
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I. LOCATING THE BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY
A. The Sociolegal Context
There is a long tradition within sociolegal research of studying
visual cues of neighborhood disorder and exploring the relationship
between those neighborhood characteristics and deviance. Prompted
by a recurring observation of dramatic variations in crime rates across
neighborhoods, the tradition grew over decades of research taking
seriously the idea that there may be "neighborhood effects" on the
production of crime. That is, arrangements in social space may signifi-
cantly affect human behavior. This research tradition traces impor-
tantly to the early Chicago School of sociology-the monographs on
neighborhoods and spatial settings, the Jewish ghetto,20 the Italian
"slum,r " the Near North side of Chicago," taxi-dance halls,3 and broth-
els ' - and to the later social interactionist research of Erving Goffman,
especially his study Behavior in Public Places,2 and others such as Al-
bert Cohen26 and Jane Jacobs.
20 See generally Louis Wirth, The Ghetto (Chicago 1928) (discussing the extent to which
isolation related to the Jewish ghetto has shaped the character of the "Jew" and the nature of his
social life).
21 See generally William F. Whyte, Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian
Slum (Chicago 1943) (exploring life and crime in a predominantly Italian slum district known as
Cornerville).
22 See generally Harvey Warren Zorbaugh, The Gold Coast and the Slum: A Sociological
Study of Chicago's Near North Side (Chicago 1929) (discussing the problems created by the
divergence of interests and heritages of the differing groups that compose the Lower North Side
of Chicago).
23 See generally Paul G. Cressey, The Taxi-Dance Hall (Chicago 1932) (offering an explora-
tion of the typical taxi-dance hall with its customers and employees, a background regarding the
history of such halls as urban institutions, and an overview of the kinds of controls established to
enforce standards).
24 See generally Walter C. Reckless, Vice in Chicago (Patterson Smith 1969) (discussing
vice in Chicago since the closing of its red light district in 1912).
25 See generally Erving Goffman, Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organiza-
tion of Gatherings (Free Press 1963) (exploring human behavior in public places).
26 See generally Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang (Free 1955)
(discussing the delinquent subculture, specifically addressing why it arises and persists in certain
neighborhoods but not in others, and offering a new perspective on the issue of psychogenic
versus cultural-transmission theories of delinquency).
27 See generally Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (Random House
1961) (offering a critique of current city planning while discussing the factors that result in posi-
tive and negative changes occurring in differing neighborhoods, the roles neighborhoods play in
cities, and what new principles should be embraced in city planning and rebuilding). As Andrew
Abbott notes, "[The] Chicago [school of thought] felt that no social fact makes any sense ab-
stracted from its context in social (and often geographic) space and social time. Social facts are
located." Andrew Abbott, Of Time and Space: The Contemporary Relevance of the Chicago
School, 75 Soc Forces 1149, 1152 (1997) (discussing the theoretical position promoted by the
Chicago school of thought in the study of sociology).
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One of the most striking findings from the neighborhood effects
research comes from the dramatic differences across neighborhoods
in rates of crime and delinquency-even across neighborhoods with
similar concentrations of social disadvantage as measured by average
rates of poverty, unemployment, familial and residential instability,
and dependence on government benefit programs. 2 Robert Sampson
and Stephen Raudenbush trace the rich intellectual history and the
variations over time in neighborhood-effects research in their thor-
ough paper, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces.'9
A consideration of the research in this area suggests two lasting
puzzles. The first puzzle focuses on locating sources of variation in
crime across neighborhoods and identifies two leading candidates.
First, differences across areas in crime rates could be due to unobserv-
able individual characteristics related to the residents of the neighbor-
hood, raising the possibility of self-selection on the part of the indi-
viduals. Put differently, some neighborhoods may have more crime
because they are home to a larger share of crime-prone people, al-
though all of the individual attributes that predispose some people to
engage in criminal activity are difficult to measure in social science
datasets. A second explanation is that variation across areas in crime
rates may be due to differences in social processes and conditions
across neighborhoods, including disorderliness or informal mechanisms
of social control. The notion of social disorganization pioneered by Clif-
ford Shaw and Henry McKay'° represented one effort to locate the an-
swer to this first puzzle, at least in part, in mechanisms of informal
social control and collective action-in identifying an agency of social
control that could be disrupted by residential mobility and economic
conditions. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Fenton Earls's Project on
Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) research
28 See, for example, Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Fenton Earls,
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Science 918,923
(1997) (offering evidence that the social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willing-
ness to intervene on behalf of the common good acts as "a robust predictor of lower rates of
violence"); Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote, and Josd A. Scheinkman, Crime and Social
Interactions, 111 Q J Econ 507,542 (1996) (arguing that the high cross-city variance in the propor-
tion of potential criminals who do not respond to social influences indicates covariance across
agents, such as the age of the criminals or the presence of strong families).
29 Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public
Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 Am J Soc 603, 637 (1999) (argu-
ing that due to shared theoretical features, both public disorder and predatory crimes are ex-
plained by a concentration of disadvantage and lowered collective efficacy).
30 Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas: A Study
of Rates of Delinquents in Relation to Differential Characteristics of Local Communities in
American Cities 446 (Chicago 1942) (establishing that the distribution of juvenile delinquents in
space and time follows the pattern of the physical structure and of the social organization of the
American city).
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represents another answer focused on informal social processes, more
specifically on the notion of "collective efficacy," which they define as
"the linkage of cohesion and mutual trust with shared expectations for
intervening in support of neighborhood social control.""
A second puzzle focuses on the issue of remedies. Even if the
neighborhood-effects research suggests a causal relationship between,
on the one hand, identifiable social processes or neighborhood charac-
teristics and, on the other hand, crime, does the causal explanation
offer insight into what can be done to change things in a public policy
sense? In this regard, the sociological theories have been relatively
quiet, reflecting a general hesitation to move from the positive to the
prescriptive.
It is within this rich research field that the broken windows hy-
pothesis emerged in the early 1980s. Though first articulated and
tested by Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, in the late 1960s,
the broken windows theory was most clearly articulated and popular-
ized in James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling's 1982 Broken Win-
dows article.12 "[D]isorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in
a kind of developmental sequence," Wilson and Kelling argued, so that
efforts to reduce disorder might ultimately translate into reductions in
criminal activity as well." Minor social disorder-littering, loitering,
public drinking, panhandling, and prostitution-as well as physical
disorder-graffiti, abandoned buildings, and littered sidewalks-if
tolerated in a neighborhood,'produce an environment that is likely to
attract crime. These forms of disorder signal to potential criminals that
delinquent behavior will not be reported or controlled -that no one is
in charge. To law-abiding citizens, these disorderly conditions signal
the need to avoid the streets or even flee the neighborhood. One bro-
ken window, left unrepaired, invites other broken windows. These pro-
31 Sampson and Raudenbush, 105 Am J Soc at 612-13 (cited in note 29) ("Just as individu-
als vary in their capacity for efficacious action, so too do neighborhoods. And just as individual
self-efficacy is situated relative to a particular task rather than global, our notion of collective
efficacy here is conceptualized as relative to the task of maintaining order in public spaces.");
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 277 Science at 919 (cited in note 28) ("[T]he collective efficacy
of residents is a critical means by which urban neighborhoods inhibit the occurrence of personal
violence, without regard to the demographic composition of the population.").
32 Wilson and Kelling, Atlantic Monthly at 29 (cited in note 1). They discuss the broken
windows hypothesis as follows:
The key is to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point-where the public order is dete-
riorating but not unreclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive
people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must quickly be fixed if all
are not to be shattered.
Id at 38.
33 Id at 31 ("Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken.").
[73:271
Broken Windows: New Evidence
gressively break down community standards and leave the community
vulnerable to crime. In this way, disorder breeds crime: "Such an area
is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is
more likely that here," Wilson and Kelling wrote, "drugs will change
hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped. That the drunks
will be robbed by boys who do it as a lark, and the prostitutes' cus-
tomers will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhapsviolently. '
The broken windows theory thus addresses the first puzzle of the
neighborhood-effects literature in a straightforward and provocative
way: it is the variation in disorder in neighborhoods that explains the
variation in crime, holding structural disadvantage constant. The real
trigger is disorderliness itself. The theory was familiar to sociologists
because of its proximity to theories of urban decay and social conta-
gion. Urban sociologists interpreted the broken windows hypothesis
through the lens of urban decline: disorderliness, dilapidation, aban-
donment, and social disorder, such as prostitution, public intoxication,
and drug use, reflected and reinforced, in a cyclical manner, declining
property values, residential instability, and the gradual decay of the
urban neighborhood.35 A closely related interpretation is suggested by
Philip Cook and Kristin Goss's review of the standard models of "so-
cial contagion."36 From this contagion perspective, the broken windows
phenomenon reflects an information cascade: people with imperfect
information about the risks and rewards of criminal activity may infer
the net returns to crime from the social environment." Information
limitations are at the heart of the information cascade model. Here,
the potential criminals do not know the probability of being detected
in a neighborhood, but the lack of enforcement of minor crime and
disorder fills this void and signals low enforcement. The characteristics
34 Id at 32.
35 See Gerald E. Frug, City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls 199-200(Princeton 1999) (discussing the effects of "get-tough" policing strategies on community building
efforts in America's urban centers); Wesley Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral
of Decay in American Cities 3 (Free 1990) (arguing that disorder, in the form of graffiti, aban-
doned cars, vandalism of public and private property, and decaying homes, is an instrument of
destabilization and neighborhood decline).
36 Philip J. Cook and Kristen A. Goss, A Selective Review of the Social-Contagion Literature
3-4 (Sanford Institute of Public Policy Studies, Duke University, Working Paper, 1996) (on file
with authors) (providing an overview of the relevant literature on "social contagion"-a term
used by scholars to describe cases in which attitudes and behaviors, especially of the antisocial
variety, spread through populations).
37 Id at 24 ("The terms 'information cascades' and 'herd behavior' describe instances in
which an individual adopts and acts on the judgments of others, not because he has been pres-
sured to do so, but because the leaders' actions are believed to convey information about the
individually optimal choice.").
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of the local physical environment, which are themselves the product of
the accumulated series of behaviors of local residents, thus communi-
cate the statistical likelihood of being apprehended. They are a signal-
ing mechanism that feeds into the calculus of whether to commit crime.
This "contagion" interpretation offers a straightforward explanation
of broken windows familiar to most sociologists and economists.
As to the second puzzle--concerning the public policy prescrip-
tions-Wilson and Kelling's original Broken Windows essay itself did
not compel a particular policy outcome. From a policy perspective, the
broken windows hypothesis is, in principle, consistent with a variety of
potential policy levers, ranging from changes in policing to community
organizing. Nevertheless, most policymakers seem to have understood
the theory as implying what has come to be known as "broken win-
dows policing" -also known as "order-maintenance," "zero-tolerance,"
or "quality-of-life" policing. So for instance, in their 2001 study,
George Kelling and William Sousa suggest that the most effective way
to address disorder and reduce crime is to increase the number of
misdemeanor arrests.'9
B. Testing the Broken Windows Hypothesis
To date, empirical testing of the broken windows theory has taken
one of two forms A first approach attempts to measure neighborhood
disorder and crime, as well as other correlates of criminality,-such as
poverty and residential instability, in order to determine whether there
are statistically interesting correlations among these variables. A sec-
38 For a discussion of the etiology of less and more serious crimes, see Michael R. Gottfred-
son and Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime 85-120 (Stanford 1990) (discussing the
relationship between an individual's development and maintenance of self-control and an
individual's propensity for criminality). For a discussion of how "routine activities" across
neighborhoods may affect criminal opportunities and outcomes, see generally Lawrence E.
Cohen and Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach,
44 Am Soc Rev 588 (1979) (arguing that the structure of routine activities, such as a dispersion of
activities away from households and families, increases the opportunity for crime and thus gen-
erates higher crime rates). See also Lawrence E. Cohen, James R. Kluegel, and Kenneth C. Land,
Social Inequality and Predatory Criminal Victimization: An Exposition and Test of a Formal
Theory, 46 Am Soc Rev 505,507 (1981) (offering an additional explanation of the "routine activi-
ties" theory of criminal victimization, focusing primarily on the role played by five factors: expo-
sure, guardianship, proximity to potential offenders, attractiveness of potential targets, and defi-
nitional properties of specific crimes themselves). Additional discussion of the "social disorgani-
zation" model of disorder and neighborhood effects on crime is provided by Robert J. Bursik, Jr.,
Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems and Prospects, 26
Criminology 519,538 (1988) (discussing criticisms of the social disorganization model as well as
new applications of the framework to substantive areas, such as victimization).
39 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter? at 7 (cited in note 6) (describing successes of the
broken windows policing strategy in terms of the increased arrests for misdemeanors and de-
creased offenses for violent crimes between 1989 and 1998).
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ond approach focuses on measures of broken windows policing-for
instance, rates of misdemeanor arrests-and conducts relatively simi-
lar statistical analyses on these variables in order, again, to identify
significant correlations. We begin by reviewing the first approach.
1. Disorder and crime.
Early on, many proponents of the broken windows hypothesis
pointed to the research of Wesley Skogan, especially his 1990 mono-
graph Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in Ameri-
can Neighborhoods, and argued that it empirically verified the broken
windows theory." Skogan's book addressed the larger question of the
impact of neighborhood disorder on urban decline, but in one section
Skogan discussed the broken windows hypothesis, ran a regression of
neighborhood disorder on robbery victimization, and concluded that
"'Broken windows' do need to be repaired quickly."" Many observers
interpreted this conclusion as an endorsement of the broken windows
theory and accepted Skogan's view of the evidence. George Kelling,
coauthor of Broken Windows and of a book entitled Fixing Broken
Windows," contended that Wesley Skogan "established the causal
links between disorder and serious crime-empirically verifying the
'Broken Windows' hypotheses."3 Dan Kahan at Yale similarly argued
that "[t]he work of criminologist Wesley Skogan supplies empirical
support for the 'broken windows' hypothesis."" Subsequent work by
one of us, however, has cast doubt on what conclusions can properly
be drawn from Skogan's analysis. 5
A few years later, Ralph Taylor of Temple University conducted
research in sixty-six neighborhoods in Baltimore using longitudinal
data, and attempted to determine the relationship between neighbor-
40 Skogan, Disorder and Decline at 120-24 (cited in note 35) (offering evidence suggesting
that a "community policing" program directed at controlling disorder in Newark, New Jersey,
could help stem the process of urban decline).
41 Id at 75.
42 George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and
Reducing Crime in Our Communities 23-27 (Simon & Schuster 1996) (discussing Skogan's find-
ings regarding the relationship between fear and disorder as evidence supporting the notion that
ignoring disorder poses dangers, such as crime and urban decline).
43 Id at 24.
44 Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va L Rev 349, 369(1997). See also Dan Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology, 95 Mich L Rev 2477,2488 n 62
(1997) ("According to criminologists, the primary cue that crime is tolerated or expected is visi-
ble public disorder.").
45 Harcourt, Illusion of Order at 78 (cited in note 2) (concluding that "there are no statisti-
cally significant relationships between disorder and purse-snatching, physical assault, burglary, or
rape when other explanatory variables are held constant .... [Thus] the data do not support the
broken windows hypothesis").
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hood crime and what he termed social and physical "incivilities"-
panhandlers, public drunks, trash, graffiti, and vacant lots, among other
things. What he found was that while certain types of incivilities were
associated with crime or urban decay, others were not. In his 2001
book, Breaking Away from Broken Windows, Taylor concludes from
his data that different types of incivilities may require different policy
responses. "Researchers and policy-makers alike," Taylor writes, "need
to break away from broken windows per se and widen the models
upon which they rely, both to predict and to preserve safe and stable
neighborhoods with assured and committed residents.
6
One of the most comprehensive and thorough examination of
the broken windows theory to date is Robert Sampson and Stephen
Raudenbush's 1999 study. Their study grows out of the PHDCN and is
based on systematic social observation: using trained observers who
drove a sports utility vehicle at five miles per hour down every street
in 196 Chicago census tracts, and randomly selecting 15,141 street
sides, they were able to collect precise data on neighborhood disorder.
With regard to the disorder-crime nexus, Sampson and Raudenbush
found that disorder and predatory crime are only moderately corre-
lated, but that, when antecedent neighborhood characteristics are
taken into account, the connection between disorder and crime "van-
ished in 4 out of 5 tests-including homicide, arguably our best meas-
ure of violence.'41 They nevertheless suggest that disorder may have
indirect, neighborhood effects on crime by influencing "migration pat-
terns, investment by businesses, and overall neighborhood viability. ' 8
On the basis of their extensive research, Sampson and Rauden-
bush conclude that "[a]ttacking public disorder through tough police
tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak
strategy to reduce crime. 4 9 As an alternative to the broken windows
theory, Sampson and Raudenbush suggest that disorder is of the same
etiology as crime-being, so often, forms of minor crime-and that
both crime and disorder have the same antecedent conditions.
46 Ralph B. Taylor, Breaking Away from Broken Windows: Baltimore Neighborhoods and
the Nationwide Fight against Crime, Guns, Fear, and Decline 22 (Westview 2001) (concluding that
a more integrated perspective, which combines the current results regarding incivilities and
contemporary knowledge regarding the multiplicity of factors affecting neighborhoods over
time, should be developed).
47 Sampson and Raudenbush, 105 Am J Soc at 637 (cited in note 29) (offering results con-
tradicting a strong version of the broken windows thesis but concluding that the role of disorder
remained theoretically relevant for other purposes).
48 Idat637.
49 Id at 638 ("A more subtle approach suggested by this article would look to how informal
but collective efforts among residents to stem disorder may provide unanticipated benefits for
increasing collective efficacy in the long run lowering crime.") (internal citation omitted).
[73:271
2006] Broken Windows: New Evidence
"Rather than conceive of disorder as a direct cause of crime, we view
many elements of disorder as part and parcel of crime itself."' Thus, "a
reasonable hypothesis is that public disorder and predatory crimes are
manifestations of the same explanatory process, albeit at different ends
of a 'seriousness' continuum.'""
2. Studies of aggressive misdemeanor-arrest policing.
Another strand of research, focusing on studies of aggressive ar-
rest policies, was also brought to bear on the broken windows hy-
pothesis. Here, too, James Q. Wilson sparked the debate, primarily
with his 1968 book Varieties of Police Behavior, and his research with
Barbara Boland on the effects of police arrests on crime. 2 Wilson and
Boland hypothesized that aggressive police patrols, involving increased
stops and arrests, have a deterrent effect on crime.
A number of contributions ensued, both supporting and criticiz-
ing these findings, but, as Robert Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen sug-
gested in 1988, the results were "mixed." 3 There have been strong con-
tributions to the literature, such as the 1999 study led by Anthony
50 Idat608.
51 Id. Sampson and Raudenbush have a more recent study showing that neighborhood
racial composition affects people's perceptions of neighborhood disorder. Robert J. Sampson
and Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction
of "Broken Windows," 67 Soc Psych Q 319 (2004). The study explores the grounds on which
individuals form perceptions of disorder. Id at 337 (concluding that although observed disorder
may predict perceived disorder to some degree, the racial and economic context affect an indi-
vidual's perceived disorder to a greater extent). For a study of disorder and youth crime in Can-
ada, see John Hagan and Bill McCarthy, Mean Streets: Youth Crime and Homelessness 12 (Cam-
bridge 1997):
[M]any contemporary studies point to positive relationships between living on the street
and minor and more serious crime, including break and enter, robbery, assault, and drug-
and sex-related offenses. We investigate an array of crimes and give particular attention to
minor and more serious theft, prostitution, drug selling, and assault.
52 See James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in
Eight Communities 281-82 (Harvard 1968) (describing three styles of police management and
concluding that a "legalistic" approach, emphasizing a high arrest rate, has gained popularity
because it has been shown to deter criminals). See also James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland,
The Effects of the Police on Crime: A Response to Jacob and Rich, 16 L & Socy Rev 163, 168-69
(1981) (critiquing a study challenging the proposition that increased arrest rates will have a
deterrent effect on crime); James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on
Crime, 12 L & Socy Rev 367, 380 (1978) ("Aggressiveness and a large number of patrol units,
separately and in combination, will lead to a higher arrest ratio for robbery, and this higher ratio,
in turn, leads to a lower robbery crime rate.").
53 Robert J. Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effect of the Police on Crime: A
Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L & Socy Rev 163,166 (1988) (discussing the results of
a disorderly conduct enforcement experiment performed by members of the Newark, New Jer-
sey, police department and finding that while the results could be seen to support the belief that
proactive policing may reduce crime, they remained mixed).
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Braga, titled Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places." But
still, most of this research is unable to distinguish between the broken
windows hypothesis and more traditional explanations of incapacita-
tion and deterrence associated with increased police arrests, presence,
contact, and surveillance. The problem is somewhat endemic to the
design of these studies. As Sampson and Cohen conclude with regard
to their own work, "It is true ... that our analysis was not able to
choose definitely between the two alternative scenarios."5
In this vein, Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies test, in their 2003 re-
search titled Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime Control in
New York, whether quality-of-life policing in New York City contrib-
uted to the reduction in lethal violence in the late 1990s. They analyze
precinct crime rates from 1999 and try to determine whether these
crime rates can be predicted by the amount of stop-and-frisk activity
that occurred in the precinct in the preceding year. Based on their
research, Fagan and Davies find that "[f]or both violence arrests
broadly and homicide arrests specifically, there is no single category of
citizen stops by police that predicts where crime will increase or de-
crease in the following year.' 6 When they examine homicide fatalities,
they observe different effects by type of stop and by victim race.
"Stops for violence are significant predictors of reductions in both gun
homicide deaths and overall homicide deaths, but only among Hispan-
ics."57 In contrast, for African Americans, no type of arrest predicts
homicide victimization a year later; and for whites, the results are not
reliable because of the low white-homicide victimization rate.
Why is it that there may be effects for Hispanics, but not for Afri-
can Americans? Fagan and Davies suggest that it may have to do with
what they call "stigma saturation" in black communities: when stigma
is applied in ways that are perceived as too harsh and unfair, it may
54 Anthony A. Braga, et al, Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Random-
ized Controlled Experiment, 37 Criminology 541, 571 (1999) (evaluating the effects of problem-
oriented policing interventions on urban violent crime problems and suggesting that police
efforts focused on "modifying the places, routine activities, and situations that promote violence
may be effective in reducing violent behavior"). See also Anthony A. Braga, Problem-Oriented
Policing and Crime Prevention 123 (Criminal Justice 2002) ("Many problem-oriented policing
interventions are multifaceted and, as such, it is complicated to evaluate a single strategy within a
varied bundle of tactics because it is difficult to isolate each response's effects.") (internal cita-
tion omitted).
55 Sampson and Cohen,22 L & Socy Rev at 185 (cited in note 53) (concluding that a model
allowing for empirical determinations of both the direct effects of police aggressiveness and the
arrest/offense ratio on crime proved elusive).
56 Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime Control
in New York, in Bernard E. Harcourt, ed, Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America 191, 205
(NYU 2003) (offering empirical evidence showing that no single enforcement measure in 1998
proved to be a significant predictor of arrest rates the following year).
57 Id.
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have reverse effects. They write, "When legal control engenders resis-
tance, opposition or defiance, the opportunity to leverage formal so-
cial control into informal social control is lost. The absence of crime
control returns from OMP [order-maintenance policing] may reflect
just such a dynamic among African Americans, who shouldered much
of the burden of OMP.''
The final and most recent contribution to this literature is Steve
Levitt's 2004 Journal of Economic Perspectives review essay, in which
he argues that policing practices probably do not explain much of the
crime drop in the 1990s because crime went down everywhere, even in
places where police departments did not implement new policing
strategies.9 Instead, Levitt attributes the massive period effects on
crime throughout the United States during the 1990s to some combi-
nation of increased imprisonment, increases in the number of police,
the ebbing of the crack epidemic that started in many big cities in the
mid 1980s, and the legalization of abortion in the United States during
the early 1970s.'°
II. NEW YORK CITY'S EXPERIENCE
In this Part we discuss the most recent studies on broken win-
dows policing in New York City, both the 2001 Kelling and Sousa
study and the evidence presented by Corman and Mocan in their 2005
paper in the Journal of Law and Economics. We argue that the 2001
Kelling and Sousa analysis has limitations that ultimately render it
uninformative about the causal effects of broken windows policing
practices. We also show that the Corman and Mocan analysis cannot
support the claim that broken windows policing activities are respon-
sible for declines in crime.
A. Kelling and Sousa (2001)
The study by George Kelling and William Sousa (hereafter KS)
fits in the larger tradition of studies of aggressive arrest policies dis-
cussed earlier. The goal of their study is the "systematic attempt to
statistically parse out the relative contributions of police actions, the
economy, demographics, and changing drug use patterns on crime" in
New York City.6' The major problem with previous studies, they argue,
is that those studies lack an adequate comparison group for New York
58 Idat210.
59 Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain
the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J Econ Perspectives 163,177 (2004).
60 Id at 184.
61 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter? at 1 (cited in note 6).
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City: previous research has either used an unsuitable comparison, such
as other cities, or failed to use any comparison at all. The key insight in
this study, Kelling and Sousa suggest, is to simulate comparison groups
by treating the city as seventy-five separate and comparable entities.
"Rather than one entity," they explain, "we view New York as 76 sepa-
rate 'cities,' corresponding to the 76 police precincts."62
The research design, then, is to statistically compare the relation-
ship between violent crime and four explanatory variables-broken
windows policing, economic indicators, young male population shifts,
and the decline in crack cocaine consumption-in the seventy-five
precincts of New York City. They find a strong negative relationship
between precinct-level misdemeanor arrests and violent crime. In what
follows we reexamine these New York City results using a wide vari-
ety of alternative statistical approaches. Our efforts to obtain, repli-
cate, and extend their data are discussed in detail in the Appendix.
Replicating the KS results is complicated in part by the fact that
in neither the KS Manhattan Institute report nor Sousa's dissertation6
3
do the authors spell out the exact estimating equations for their analy-
sis. Nor does their Table 4, which presents their key results, show the
number of observations used to generate their estimates (to give some
sense for how the analysis is structured).6' Nevertheless, from reading
over the discussion in KS and in Sousa's dissertation it would appear
that they are estimating a two-level hierarchical linear growth model,
of the sort discussed in Chapter 6 of Raudenbush and Bryk's Hierar-
61
chical Linear Models. If we let level 1 in this model represent time
(subscripted by t) and level 2 represent precincts (subscripted by i),
we believe that the two-level linear growth model that they are esti-
mating is given by the following equations:
(1) VC, = 0, + 7rt, A, + F,;
(2) 7rEO = a6 + ao MA, + a02 Xi + r,,; and
(3) 71, = a 0 + all MA, + a12 X, + r1 ,
62 Id at 4 & n 27 (explaining that in 1994, one precinct was divided into two, resulting in
seventy-six precincts existing today but that to maintain consistency over the studied period the
original seventy-five precincts were used).
63 See generally, William H. Sousa, Jr., Crime Reduction in New York City: The- Impact of
the N.Y.P.D., unpublished PhD dissertation, Rutgers University (2003), online at http://
wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3088010 (visited Jan 19,2006).
64 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter? at 9 (cited in note 6).
65 Stephen W. Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models:Applications
and Data Analysis Methods 161 (Sage 2d ed 2002) ("The development of hierarchical linear models
has created a powerful set of techniques for research on individual change. When applied with
valid measurements from a multi-time-point design, these models afford an integrated approach
for studying the structure and predictors of individual growth.").
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where
gcti = violent crimes in precinct (i) in year (t);
A, = time (1989, 1990,... 1998);
MA, = precinct (i)'s average misdemeanor arrests over the sam-
ple period; and
Xi = average value of other covariates for precinct (i) over the
sample period.
The empirical setup that is being estimated by KS is easier to see
by substituting equations (2) and (3) into (1) to get the reduced-form
estimating equation (4):
(4) VC,,= 0, + 032 MA,+ 33A, + 134 MA,*A, + Fti"
The intuition behind what Kelling and Sousa are doing here is
more straightforward than the statistical notation and equations might
suggest: do police precincts with relatively higher levels of average
misdemeanor arrests during the 1990s (MA) experience relatively
larger declines in violent crime (VC) during this period? In statistical
terms, the coefficient 132 will be positive if police activity (measured here
by misdemeanor arrests) is relatively greater in higher-crime areas.
Since crime rates were declining throughout the United States during
the 1990s we expect the overall linear trend among all New York City
precincts to be declining (33 will be negative). The key empirical ques-
tion of interest for the KS hypothesis is whether the estimate for the
coefficient 13, in equation (4) is negative-that is, is the decline in vio-
lent crime larger in precincts with relatively higher numbers of aver-
age misdemeanor arrests?
We can replicate the key coefficient in their analysis (134 or,
equivalently, a1 ,) as shown in the first row of Table 1, where we esti-
mate equation (4) measuring all of our variables in precinct counts
(rather than per capita rates) and do not weight by precinct popula-
tion. Note that as shown in Table 1, these estimates are not very sensi-
tive to decisions about whether to weight by precinct population or
not, Or to work in per capita crime and arrest rates rather than counts.
Note also that the coefficient and standard error for the effects of
misdemeanor arrest rates on the time slope in Violent crimes, which is
the key estimate of interest, is identical to what is reported in KS Ta-
ble 4," although our point estimates for the intercept terms have a
slightly different scaling.
66 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter? at 9 (cited in note 6).
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TABLE 1
Replicating Kelling and Sousa's Multilevel Model
with a Reduced-Form Single Equation Model
Model specification: Coefficient on Coefficient on
dependent variable = MA MA*A
Crime counts, 72.68 (5.94) -.036 (.003)
not population weighted
Crime counts,
population weighted 70.06 (13.20) -.035 (.007)
Crime rates, 509.95 (0.27) -.255 (.0001)
not population weighted
Crime rates,
population weighted 139.02 (76.56) -.070 (.038)
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each row in Table 1 represents the results from
estimating a separate regression of the form VC, - 1, + 13, MAj + 3 A, + P,4 MA,*A, + &, where VC
= violent crimes for precinct (i) in year (t), MA = misdemeanor arrests for precinct (i) in year (t),
and A = year (ranging from 1989 to 1998). See text for additional details.
Kelling and Sousa conclude from these results that the broken
windows strategy is highly effective at crime fighting. The bottom line:
"The average NYPD precinct during the ten-year period studied
could expect to suffer one less violent crime for approximately every
28 additional misdemeanor arrests made."67 This, Kelling and Sousa
suggest, offers "the most-definitive possible answer to the question of
whether police mattered in New York City during its intense crime-
drop.
,,6
Our conclusion from these results is somewhat different, and it
points in the direction of mean reversion. Any study of the influences
on American crime patterns during the past twenty years is compli-
cated by the massive period effects that have generated dramatic year-
to-year changes in crime across the country. The increase in crime
rates was particularly dramatic from the mid 1980s through the early-
to-mid 1990s, which is thought to have been driven largely by the
growth in crack cocaine use and involvement of firearms in the new
street markets for crack.61 Using city-level data, Steven Raphael and
67 Id.
68 Id at 1.
69 See Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J Crim L &
Criminology 10, 10 (1995) (examining some empirical data reflecting changing crime patterns
beginning in the mid 1980s and concluding that the illegal drug markets' recruitment of youths
resulted in a dramatic growth in youth homicide). See also Philip J. Cook and John H. Laub,
After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth Violence in the United States 22 (NBER Working
Paper 8571, Oct 2001), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8571 (visited Jan 19, 2006) (dis-
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one of us show that those cities that experienced the largest increases
in crime during this period subsequently also experienced the largest
crime drops.'° A natural concern is that the same process may be at
work at the neighborhood or police precinct level as well.
Figure 1 suggests that crime patterns across New York precincts
that KS attributes to the effects of broken windows policing can be
explained by mean reversion: broken windows policing (as measured
by misdemeanor arrests) was conducted most intensively in New York
within the city's most violent neighborhoods, which are the areas that
experienced the largest increases in violent crime during the 1980s
and the largest declines in violent crime during the 1990s. Panel A
shows that at the start of the KS panel (1989) precincts with higher
violent crime rates also have higher rates of misdemeanor arrests. That
is, the regression line relating violent crime and misdemeanor arrests
in 1989 has a positive slope, consistent with Kelling and Sousa's own
findings (top panel of their Table 4).7" Panel B shows that the most
violent precincts in 1989 also experienced the largest increase in ris-
demeanor arrests from 1989 to 1998. Panel C shows that the
neighborhoods with the highest violent crime rates in 1989 experi-
enced the largest declines in such crimes from 1989 to 1998.
cussing epidemics of youth violence in different time periods and concluding that the observed
youth violence of the late 1980s was closely tied to the epidemic of crack cocaine).
70 Raphael and Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements at 267 (cited in note 16) ("To
summarize, the large increase in homicide rates occurring during the late 1980s in Richmond
coupled with the inverse relationship between earlier and later changes in homicide rates ob-
served among other U.S. cities casts doubt on the validity of previous claims about the effects of
Project Exile.").
71 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter? at 9 (cited in note 6).
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FIGURE 1
Misdemeanor Arrests and Violent Crime
in NYC Precincts, 1989-1998
A: Misdemeanor Arrest 1989 B: Change Misdemeanor Arrest 1989-1998
a versus Violent Crime 1989
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Why do precincts with unusually high initial crime rates experi-
ence unusually large declines in crime thereafter? Mean reversion is a
good candidate. Panel D shows that, as is true with city-level crime
data, those police precincts with the largest increases in crime during
the crack epidemic have the largest declines thereafter. Most crimi-
nologists believe that this increase in violent crime was driven by the
crack cocaine epidemic and attendant violence in the crack market,
which began to ebb during the early 1990s. Hence those places where
crack served to drive violent crime to unusually high levels at the
height of the epidemic would be expected to experience the largest
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D: Violent Crime Changes,
1989-1998 versus 1984-1989
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subsequent declines as the influence on violence from crack use and
distribution begin to wane.
The KS analysis seems particularly susceptible to confounding
from mean reversion because their model basically relates changes in
violent crimes (each precinct's linear trend in violent crime over the
1989-1998 period) to the levels of misdemeanor arrests (average ar-
rests from 1989 to 1998). Put differently, their analysis throws away all
of the over-time variation in misdemeanor arrests across precincts
from 1989 to 1998, and simply relates variation in the linear trend in
violent crime rates across precincts to variation in the average number
of misdemeanor arrests over this period. 2 The level of misdemeanor
arrests is strongly related to the initial level of violent crimes, as sug-
gested by Figure 1, which may lead to a spurious association between
misdemeanor arrests and violent crimes in their study.3
Table 2 presents the results of a more formal analysis that seems
to implicate mean reversion:
72 In this sense their two-level linear growth model is set up in a fashion analogous to
Raudenbush and Bryk's 2002 example, which related changes in student's test scores measured
four times each year over several years with the total hours of instruction the child received. See
Raudenbush and Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models at 167 (cited in note 65). But the time trend
in the key treatment variable of interest in the policing example seems to matter much more
than in the schooling example offered by Raudenbush and Bryk.
73 The problem of relating levels against changes can be illustrated with a simple hypo-
thetical example:
Precinct Year MA VC
1 1989 150 500
1 1990 100 400
1 1991 50 300
2 1989 75 500
2 1990 50 475
2 1991 1 25 450
Precinct 1 has a higher mean number of misdemeanor arrests over the sample period than
does Precinct 2 (100 versus 50), and also experiences a larger decline in violent crimes per year
(100 per year compared to only 25 in Precinct 2). The Kelling-Sousa model applied to these data
would suggest a negative relationship between misdemeanor arrests (MA) and the time trend in
violent crime (VC) across precincts-more misdemeanor arrests, less crime. However regressing
changes against changes-the change over time in violent crimes against the change in misde-
meanor arrests-would yield the opposite conclusion.
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TABLE 2
Effects of Model Specification and Mean Reversion
in the Kelling-Sousa Analysis: Regressing
Crime Changes against Arrest Levels
Explanatory Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
variables:
Average -.303** -.221** -.079** -.082** -.101"* -.031
arrests, (.035) (.023) (.019) (.022) (.019) (.024)
1989-1998










covariates? N N N N N Y
N 75 74 74 74 74 74
R-squared .504 .811 .915 .914 .939 .970
epen aiIat ule = PLcllct change vioient crimes, 1989-l98. umner covanates include
change from 1989 to 1998 in poverty, racial and age composition of the population, percent
households headed by females, public assistance, vacant housing. For models 2 through 6, we are
using 1984 crime data for one precinct. * = Statistically significant at 10 percent cut-off ** =
Statistically significant at 5 percent cut-off.
The first row of Table 2 presents estimates for the parameters in
equation (5) below, where the change in violent crimes within a pre-
cinct for the period 1989 to 1998 is regressed against the average
number of misdemeanor arrests within that precinct over the entire
1989 to 1998 period. This simple model is based on the same intuition
as the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) linear growth model of KS,
although the key difference is that our dependent variable is the ac-
tual change in violent crimes from 1989 to 1998 for each precinct
rather than each precinct's estimated linear trend in violent crimes
over this period. (The choice by KS to fit a linear trend through these
violent crime counts for each precinct is itself a bit puzzling given that
Appendix Figure 1 in our paper and Figure 1 in their Manhattan Insti-
tute report" show a nonlinear trend in such crimes in New York over
74 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter? at 6 (cited in note 6).
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this period, first increasing for a few years and then declining thereaf-
ter.) The average number of misdemeanor arrests within these pre-
cincts has a strong negative relationship with the change in violent
crime rates over this period, as with the basic results presented by KS.
(5) AVC, = k, + X2 MA, + v,
The remaining rows of Table 2 show that controlling for either
the precinct's 1989 violent crimes or change from 1984 to 1989 in vio-
lent crimes reduces the coefficient on the average misdemeanor arrest
variable by more than two-thirds. The reason is suggested by our Fig-
ure 1: the average number of misdemeanor arrests over the 1989-1998
period is highest in those precincts that experienced the largest in-
creases in crime from 1984 to 1989 and had the largest number of vio-
lent crimes in 1989. Statistically relating the average number of mis-
demeanor arrests from 1989 to 1998 with the decline in violent crimes
over this period without controlling for differences across precincts in
the run-up in violent crime they experienced during the crack epi-
demic mistakenly attributes the influence of these initial conditions
and subsequent mean reversion to the average number of misde-
meanor arrests. Unfortunately, none of the proxies for crack, including
the borough-level measure of cocaine-related hospital discharges used
by Kelling and Sousa, seem to adequately capture the influence of
crack markets and use on crime. For example, the cocaine proxy used
by KS does not have a statistically significant relationship to violent
crime rates in their own analysis," nor is this variable statistically sig-
nificant when included in our own models (and by implication does
not change any of the other results shown in our Table 2, either).
In contrast to the weak explanatory power of the KS proxy for
crack-related violence-admittedly an extremely difficult phenome-
non to quantify-the final row of our Table 2 shows that controlling
for the set of detailed precinct-level covariates in our dataset yields an
estimated relationship between the change in violent crime and the
1989-1998 average number of misdemeanor arrests that is about 10
percent as large as the baseline estimate and no longer statistically
significant. These covariates include measures of structural disadvan-
tage (such as the percent of the precinct that is poor, receiving public
assistance, or has less than a high school degree), demographics (per-
cent of the precinct in their peak offending ages, percent of house-
holds headed by a female, percent black), measures of physical disor-
75 Id at 9.
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der (percent of housing units that are vacant), and police manpower
assigned to the precinct."
(6) AVCj = X + k2 A MA, + v,
Now suppose we instead use the within-precinct over-time varia-
tion in the data by relating changes in violent crime rates from 1989 to
1998 to changes over this period in misdemeanor arrests, as in equa-
tion (6) above. The results from this analysis, shown in Table 3 below,
suggest that if anything, increases in misdemeanor arrests are accom-
panied by increases in violent crime-more misdemeanor arrests,
more crime. While the positive relationship between changes in mis-
demeanor arrests and changes in violent crime is somewhat sensitive
to the model specification, there is no evidence from this first-
difference model of a negative relationship between changes in mis-
demeanor arrests and violent crime. The expectation that violent
crime should decline in response to an increase in misdemeanor ar-
rests is the key empirical prediction of the argument that broken win-
dows policing is effective. Although the Kelling-Sousa analysis does
not directly test this prediction, our own analysis shown in Table 3
demonstrates that the data are not consistent with the idea that
stepped-up zero-tolerance policing reduces crime.
76 The police manpower variable is potentially problematic because some arrests within a
precinct might be made by law enforcement officers who are officially assigned to different
areas, although our results are not sensitive to excluding this variable. Adding just a control for
the percent of the precinct's population that is black to the baseline model in the first column of
Table 2 reduces the coefficient on average number of misdemeanor arrests from -0.30 to -0.28.
Including the Kelling and Sousa measures of cocaine-related hospital discharges and borough-
level unemployment rates has little effect on the results shown in Table 2.
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TABLE 3
The Effects of Model Specification and Mean Reversion in the
Kelling-Sousa Analysis: Regressing Crime Changes
Against Arrest Changes
Explanatory Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
variables:
Average -.086 -.046 -.114** -.114** -.094** -.004
misdemeanor (.074) (.051) (.022) (.022) (.025) (.030)
arrests,
1989-1998
-.660** -.710** -.716** -.625**
1989 (.023) (.039) (.039) (.041)
Change -1.762** -.214 .243* -.013






coaae? N N N N N Ycovariates?
N 75 74 74 74 74 74
R-squared .018 .561 .924 .926 .928 .969
Dependent variable - Precinct change violent crimes, 1989-1998. Other covariates include
change from 1989 to 1998 in poverty, racial and age composition of the population, percent
households headed by females, public assistance, and vacant housing. * = Statistically significant
at 10 percent cut-off, ** Statistically significant at 5 percent cut-off.
B. Corman and Mocan (2005)
But even putting aside these precinct comparisons, for many ob-
servers the massive drop in New York City's crime rate during the
1990s-coincident with the onset of broken windows policing in the
city -alone provides compelling proof of the efficacy of this policing
strategy. Corman and Mocan's analysis provides a more formal ver-
sion of this same insight, by analyzing monthly time-series data for
New York City as a whole. Controlling for city-wide measures of New
York's unemployment rate, real minimum wage, incarceration rate,
police manpower, number of fourteen to sixteen year olds and lagged
values of monthly crime rates, they find a negative relationship be-
tween city-wide misdemeanor arrest rates and city-wide robbery and
motor vehicle theft rates. They do not find a relationship between the
former and other types of crime. While Corman and Mocan's time
series uses data from 1970 to 2000, graphs of their data suggest that
the relationship between misdemeanor arrests and crime would ap-
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pear to be driven by the unusually large increase in misdemeanor ar-
rests that occurred in New York during the mid-to-late 1990s.71
What can we conclude about the causal effects on crime of bro-
ken windows policing-at least as measured by misdemeanor arrests?
Research designs that rely on time-series data for a single jurisdiction
(in their case, New York) typically provide weak power to rule out
alternative explanations for the patterns observed in the data. For ex-
ample, consider just one candidate counterexplanation, what we term
the "Broken Yankees Hypothesis" (BYH). When the New York Yan-
kees do well, violence should decline through the strengthened social
ties that develop by the bonding that occurs among the city's residents
at local bars and restaurants, with much of the city's attention focused
on a single, shared goal. When the Yankees do poorly, residents may
be less likely to aggregate together for a common purpose in commu-
nal settings, and the team's poor performance may even spur dissension
among New Yorkers over the causes of these failures.
Although Corman and Mocan were not willing to share their
monthly time-series data with us, we were able to construct on our
own an annual time series for New York measuring crime rates and a
reasonable proxy for the operational mechanism behind the Broken
Yankees Hypothesis, defined as the cumulative number of World Se-
ries championships dating back to 1921.7' Figure 2 provides what ap-
pears to be some empirical support for the BYH: the strong perform-
ance of Billy Martin's Yankees teams during the late 1970s coincides
with a drop in homicides, but even more striking is the massive decline
in homicides that accompanies the consistent excellence of Joe Torre's
squads beginning in the late 1990s. A time-series regression of the
homicide rate against the BYH index and lags of the murder variable
frequently yields a negative and statistically significant coefficient (and
even controlling for lagged values of robbery to proxy for other crimi-
nogenic characteristics), although we note that the magnitudes of the
point estimate and standard error are somewhat sensitive to the
choice of lag length.
77 Hope Corman and Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks and Broken Windows 28 (NBER Work-
ing Paper 9061, July 2002), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9061 (visited Jan 19, 2006)
(showing that after hovering between 9,000 and 14,000 between 1982 and 1994, the number of
misdemeanor arrests in New York City nearly doubled from 1994 to 2000). See also Corman and
Mocan, 48 J L & Econ at 244 (cited in note 14).
78 These data come from the New York Yankees website. Major League Baseball, Yankees
Championship Clubs (New York Yankees 2005), online at http://newyork.yankeesmlb.com/
NASApp/mlb/nyy/history/championships.jsp (visited Jan 19,2006).
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FIGURE 2
NYC Homicides versus Yankee Championships
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Although our simple empirical example is not intended to pro-
vide a rigorous test of the Broken Yankees Hypothesis, it does serve to
highlight the vulnerability of single-city time-series findings to coun-
terexplanations. An equally or perhaps even more plausible counter-
explanation for New York City's crime pattern during the 1990s comes
from the dramatic period effects that caused crime to decline almost
everywhere throughout the United States during this period, even in
cities that did not adopt innovative policing strategies."
We have, in sum, tried to demonstrate that the correlations that
have been reported in previous research between misdemeanor ar-
rests and crime rates in New York City cannot provide evidence for a
79 See Levitt, 18 J Econ Perspectives at 163 (cited in note 59). Levitt argues that crime
declined throughout the United States during the 1990s due to some combination of more police,
increased incarceration, the ebbing of the crack epidemic that is widely thought to have caused
violent crimes to increase during the late 1980s, and legalization of abortion during the early
1970s. Id at 186 ("Other factors often cited as important factors driving the decline do not appear
to have played an important role: the strong economy, changing demographics, innovative polic-
ing strategies, gun laws and increased use of capital punishment."). While we find Levitt's expla-
nation persuasive, accepting the specific bundle of causal factors implicated by Levitt is not
crucial to our argument for a skeptical interpretation of Corman and Mocan's findings. One need
only accept Levitt's observation that crime dropped everywhere over this period to accept the
importance of common period effects in understanding crime drops during the 1990s.
20061
The University of Chicago Law Review
causal effect of zero-tolerance policing on crime. It is true, of course,
that disentangling this causal relationship is a difficult task given the
wide variety of confounding factors that lead crime rates to vary so
dramatically across areas over time. Nevertheless, from a public policy
perspective, the faith that many policymakers place in the efficacy of
broken windows policing is in the end just faith, rather than the result
of convincing empirical evidence. In the next Part we try to overcome
some of these inferential difficulties by examining the effects on crime
of the basic social process that motivates zero-tolerance policing and
that is at the heart of the broken windows hypothesis-disorder.
III. EVIDENCE FROM THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY EXPERIMENT
Suppose that we could design the ideal social experiment to test
the effects of disorder alone on criminal behavior. We would start with
a sample of people who were at high risk for criminal offending and
were living in very socially disordered communities. We would then
randomly assign some of these families, but not others, to neighbor-
hoods that were less disorderly-ideally, much less disorderly, so that
the "treatment dose" that families experience from neighborhood
moves would be large enough to yield statistically detectable impacts
on behavior. In this idealized experiment we would then wish to fol-
low participants for many years, measure their involvement in criminal
activity in different ways (for example with both self reports and admin-
istrative arrest records) as well as characteristics of their neighborhoods,
and be careful to minimize sample attrition.
The MTO experiment, launched in 1994 by HUD, conforms in
most ways to the parameters of the ideal experiment described above,
with the one exception being that MTO changes other neighborhood
characteristics for program participants as well. In what follows, we
provide a review of the effects of MTO on criminal offending by pro-
gram participants about five years after random assignment, and dis-
cuss their implications for ongoing debates about broken windows
policies.' °
We show that MTO succeeds in moving families to neighbor-
hoods that are characterized by much lower levels of both physical
and social disorder-arguably a more relevant "treatment indicator"
for measuring the broken windows hypothesis compared to more indi-
rect policy levers such as misdemeanor arrests that may or may not
80 These results have previously been reported in greater technical detail. See generally
Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 120 Q J Econ 87 (cited in note 19). See also generally Jens Ludwig,
Jeffrey R. Kling, and Maria J. Hanratty, Neighborhood Effects on Crime over the Life Cycle
(Georgetown University Public Policy Institute Working Paper, 2004) (on file with authors).
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succeed in reducing disorder. However, we also show that the findings
from MTO are not consistent with the idea that change in neighbor-
hood disorder is enough to change criminal activity. At the very least,
MTO helps bound the size of the effect on crime that could result
from reducing disorder: such disorder impacts cannot be any larger
than whatever pernicious effects on criminal behavior arise from some
increase in neighborhood characteristics related to affluence.
A. Background on MTO
Sponsored by HUD, MTO has been in operation since 1994 in
five cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.
Eligibility for the program was restricted to low-income families with
children, living in public or Section 8 project-based housing in selected
high-poverty census tracts." The approximately 4,600 families who
volunteered for the program from 1994 to 1997 were randomly as-
signed into one of three groups. The Experimental group was offered
the opportunity to relocate using a housing voucher that could only be
used to lease a unit in census tracts with 1990 poverty rates of 10 per-
cent or less." Movers through MTO were required to stay in these
tracts for at least one year. Experimental group families were also
provided with mobility assistance and in some cases other counseling
services as well. Families assigned to the Section 8 group were offered
housing vouchers with no constraints under the MTO program design
on where the vouchers could be redeemed. Families assigned to the
Control group were offered no services under MTO, but did not lose
access to social services to which they were otherwise entitled, such as
public housing.
Because of random assignment, MTO yields three comparable
groups of families living in very different kinds of neighborhoods dur-
ing the postprogram period. This random assignment helps overcome
the self-selection problem that is very likely to plague most previous
81 See Orr, et al, Moving to Opportunity Interim Impacts Evaluation at i-ii (cited in note
17). Section 8 project-based housing might be thought of as essentially privately-operated public
housing. Edgar 0. Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income Households, in R. Moffit, ed,
Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States 366,371-74 (Chicago 2003) (explaining that
HUD contracts with private providers to develop and manage housing projects that include units
reserved for low-income families).
82 Housing vouchers provide families with subsidies to live in private-market housing. The
subsidy amount is typically defined as the difference between 30 percent of the household's
income and the HUD-defined Fair Market Rent, which ranges between the fortieth and fiftieth
percentiles of the local area rent distribution. See HUD, Fair Market Rents: Increased Fair Mar-
ket Rents and Higher Payment Standards for Certain Areas, 65 Fed Reg 58870,58870 (2000). For
a general overview of the history and implementation of housing vouchers under Section 8, see
Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income Households at 368-86 (cited in note 81).
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studies of "neighborhood effects" in general or "broken windows" in
particular.
The results summarized below from Kling, Ludwig and Katz
(2005) and Ludwig and Kling (2005) measure the delinquency and
criminal behavior of youth in MTO using two main sources: survey
data and administrative arrest records. Adults were surveyed, but they
were not asked about criminal behavior, so we can only measure adult
criminal activity using official arrest records. Information on potential
mediating processes that could lead to these outcomes comes from the
surveys as well as administrative data on local-area crime rates.83
The families in the main survey sample enrolled in the MTO
demonstration from 1994 to 1997. At the time of enrollment, the head
of household completed a baseline survey that included information
about the family as well as some specific information about each child.
Descriptive statistics for the baseline characteristics of youth and
adults are shown in Table 4 below. Overall about two-thirds of MTO
participants are black, with the program populations in Chicago and
Baltimore almost entirely black and an even mix between black and
Hispanic in the other sites. MTO households are quite poor, with
around three-quarters having been on welfare at baseline. One-quarter
of household heads had their first child before the age of eighteen,
and only a little more than half of all household heads had a GED or
high school diploma. Around three-quarters of households report
gangs and drugs as the first or second most important reason that they
enrolled in the MTO program, while around one-half report access to
better schools as one of their top two reasons. Eligibility for the MTO
program was limited to families in public housing or Section 8 project-
based housing located in some of the most disadvantaged census
tracts in the five MTO cities and, for that matter, in the country as a
whole.
83 For more detail on these data sources see Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 120 Q J Econ at App
1 (cited in note 19) (providing survey data, local area crime rate data, and administrative data on
arrests).
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TABLE 4
Baseline Descriptive Statistics for MTO Adult and Youth Samples
FEMALES MALES
Exp S8 Control Exp S8 Control
ADULTS
Black .650 .646 .657 .359 .364 .386
Hispanic .294 .297 .298 .505 .494 .487
MTO site:
Baltimore .150 .162 .147 .039 .071 .051
Boston .229 .223 .221 .211 .192* .287
Chicago .209 .209 .210 .149 .128 .131
LA .155 .149 .158 .304 .351 .345
NYC .257 .257 .264 .297** .259 .185
HH on




Drugs, crime .767 .755 .783 .739 .755 [764
Schools .468 .521** .465 .469 .577 .489
Age at end 38.96 39.40 39.13 43.00 43.39 44.84
of 2001
Any pre- .258 .231 .260 .375 .423 .354
RA arrest
Missing
admin arrest .038 .054 .035 .056 .048 .057
data
N 1,483 1,013 1,102 224 153 166
YOUTH
Black .647 .606 .640 .609 .605 .612
Hispanic .296 .318 .304 .329 .333 .339
MTO site:
Baltimore .168 .138 .140 .151 .154 .139
Boston .187 .192 .216 .166 .200 .189
Chicago .210 .215 .203 .220 .209 .205
LA .165 .185 .199 .195 .189 .196
NYC .270 .271 .242 .269 .248 .270
HH on




Drugs, crime .807 .732 .782 .780 .760 .791
Schools .460 .524 .483 .511 .549 .505
Age at end 19.05 18.90 18.90 19.02 18.86 18.96
of 2001
Any pre- .062 .041 .048 .147 .122 .131
RA arrest
Missing
admin arrest .057 .048 .055 .059 .063 .061
data I
N 966 651 716 988 691 739
Source: Ludwig and Kling (2005). NOTES: * Difference with Control mean statistically significant
at 10 percent cut-off ** = Difference with Control mean statistically significant at 5 percent cut-off.
Consistent with random assignment of families to MTO groups,
Table 4 shows that there are no statistically significant differences
.The University of Chicago Law Review
across MTO groups in the fraction of male or female adults or youth
who have ever been arrested prior to random assignment or for other
baseline characteristics. These results, together with those presented
elsewhere, suggest that MTO random assignment was in fact random.-
Of the families with youth in the survey sample (aged fifteen to
twenty years old at the end of 2001), 44 percent of those in the Ex-
perimental group and 57 percent of those in the Section 8 group com-
plied with the treatment (that is, relocated through MTO). These
moves lead to substantial differences in neighborhood attributes
across treatment groups, as seen in Table 5 below. Four years after ran-
dom assignment, the average census tract poverty rate (from the 2000
Census) for families assigned to the Section 8 group was 18 percent
lower than that of the Control group, while families assigned to the
Experimental group had average census tract poverty rates 24 percent
below those of Controls. Assignment to either the Experimental or
Section 8 groups reduces local-area (police precinct) violent crime
rates by 13-15 percent compared to Controls, with proportionally
smaller effects on property crime rates. Given the changes in tract
poverty rates induced by MTO, it is surprising that the program en-
genders so little residential integration with respect to race. The aver-
age family in all three MTO groups lives in a census tract where the
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TABLE 5
Effects of Moving to Opportunity Random Assignment on
Community Disorder and Other Neighborhood Characteristics
Control Exp - Exp - S8- S8-
- all all movers all movers
Neighborhood character-
istics, four years after
randomization (all five
MTO sites):
Avg tract poverty rate 41.68 31.70 19.24 34.38 28.49
% in tract with pov 0 -. 2 13.43 33.75 65.05 21.91 29.74
% in tract with pov .2 - .4 33.73 33.90 26.81 42.46 51.61
% in tract with pov> .4 52.83 32.35 8.14 35.63 18.65
Avg tract black 53.93 53.27 41.29 52.05 50.79
Avg tract minority 89.27 84.20 73.94 87.83 85.08
Violent crime rate per 235 204 128 200 201
10,000
Property crime rate per 513 491 373 463 508
10,000
Adult survey reports on .65 .53 .43 .57 .58
neighborhood in 2002
(all five sites)
Neighbors would not .47 .36 .26 .41 .40
likely do something
about truant children
Neighbors would not .48 .38 .19 .40 .32
likely do something
about spraying or graffiti
Problem in neighborhood
with police not coming .33 .22 .11 .27 .23
when called
Misdemeanor arrest rate,
4 years after randomiza- 6838 5294 3587 5758 4428
tion (NYC site only)
Note: Panel on adult survey reports from Kling,
ages fifteen to twenty-five at the end of 2001.
Ludwig, and Katz (2U5), for adults witn youtn
The bottom panel of Table 5 presents results from surveys of
MTO adults conducted from four to seven years after random assign-
ment about their perceptions of physical and social disorder within
their neighborhoods, as well as the quality of local policing. Adults
assigned to the Experimental or Section 8 groups are less likely than
Controls to report that neighbors would fail to get involved if local
youth were truant or engaging in delinquency (spray-painting graffiti).
The next row shows that adults in the Experimental and Section 8
group also report less physical disorder as well compared to the re-
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ports of adults in the Control group, as measured by the fraction that
report that graffiti is a problem in the neighborhood.
A 2003 study prepared for HUD demonstrates that MTO reduces
a wide variety of other self-reported measures of neighborhood social
and physical disorder as well for both the Experimental and Section 8
groups relative to Controls, including 20-30 percent increases in the
fraction who feel safe in their neighborhood at night, one-quarter re-
ductions in the share who saw drugs in their neighborhood the preced-
ing thirty days, 10-15 percent declines in the share who report prob-
lems with litter, trash, graffiti, or abandoned buildings in the neighbor-
hood, 15-25 percent declines in the share who report problems with
public drinking or groups of people hanging out in public spaces, and
10-25 percent increases in the share who are satisfied or very satisfied
with their neighborhoods."
The last row of Table 5 highlights the potential problems with the
key explanatory variable used in the 2001 KS study, namely the police
precinct misdemeanor arrest rate. These data are available for New
York but not the other MTO sites. The final row of Table 5 shows as-
signment to either the Experimental or Section 8 groups substantially
reduces the local misdemeanor arrest rate compared to the neighbor-
hoods in which the Control group resides." Yet the survey data re-
ported by the MTO participants reveal that Experimental or Section 8
assignment also reduces social and physical disorder. This fact rein-
forces the notion that measures of zero-tolerance policing such as
misdemeanor arrests may not be very informative about variation
across neighborhoods in actual disorder.
MTO enables us to rigorously test what happens to individuals'
criminal behavior when they move to neighborhoods characterized by
what broken windows theory predicts should be of greatest relevance-
order and disorder." Of course as Table 5 shows, MTO also induces
85 See Orr, et al, Moving to Opportunity Interim Impacts Evaluation at 66 (cited in note 17)
(presenting data on MTO Housing and Neighborhood Safety and Conditions Outcomes).
86 This finding is consistent with our analysis above demonstrating that the highest levels
and largest increases in misdemeanor arrests in New York City during the 1990s were in the
highest crime (and so presumably most disadvantaged) police precincts. See text accompanying
notes 69-73.
87 Ideally we would wish to complement the survey-based measures of social and physical
disorder obtained from MTO adults with measures for systematic social observation (SSO) of
the sort pioneered by the PHDCN research team. See generally Sampson, 105 Am J Soc 603
(cited in note 29) (describing research methods). Such data were not collected as part of the
MTO evaluation for cost and other reasons, although fortunately PHDCN research shows that,
at least for Chicago neighborhoods, measures of disorder from SSO and surveys are highly corre-
lated. See id at 625. SSO measures of disorder are also highly correlated with neighborhood
structural disadvantage. See id at 624. The fact that various measures of disorder and structural
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changes in a variety of other characteristics of the communities in
which program participants live, including lower crime rates, fewer
low-income residents, and more residents with high levels of schooling
or occupation in high-status jobs. Findings from MTO thus provide a
test of the combined effects of reducing community disorder together
with increasing neighborhood affluence, the sort of combined neighbor-
hood changes that we would expect in normal circumstances: when
government policies reduce neighborhood disorder, an important local
amenity, we would expect gentrification to occur to some degree and so
change the socioeconomic composition of the neighborhood somewhat.
B. Effects of MTO on Criminal Behavior
Analysis of arrest records and survey data suggests that moving
to a less disadvantaged, less disorderly neighborhood does not on net
reduce criminal behavior for MTO program participants. While some
subgroups do respond to moves to less disorderly neighborhoods by
reducing their involvement in criminal behavior, most notably female
youth, these effects are offset by increases in antisocial behavior
among other subgroups. Nothing in broken windows theory or most
other models of neighborhood effects suggests that such influences on
criminal behavior should be strongly contingent on people's demo-
graphic characteristics. Therefore, at the very least, broken windows is
not a complete explanation for how communities influence criminal
behavior, because even if the broken windows mechanism is at work
for MTO participants, other behavioral processes seem to predomi-
nate for at least some subgroups. Moreover, for policy purposes what
is most relevant is the impact of neighborhood disorder on the overall
offending rate, and MTO provides fairly strong evidence that for at
least this population there is no net reduction in crime or other anti-
social behaviors.
The first row of Table 6, adapted from Ludwig and Kling (2005),
summarizes the main MTO finding: when we pool youth and adults,
using data for both males and females, and compare overall arrests
across MTO groups, we find no statistically significant differences in
arrest rates for people who live in neighborhoods with quite different
levels of physical and social disorder. The intent-to-treat (ITr) esti-
mates compare the average number of arrests for everyone assigned
to the Experimental versus Control groups or Section 8 versus Con-
trol, regardless of whether the family has moved through the MTO
disadvantage are all highly correlated means that MTO provides a test for the causal effects of
changing all of these neighborhood attributes simultaneously.
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program.88 The estimates for the effects of treatment-on-the-treated
(TOT) are essentially equal to the IIT estimates divided by the frac-
tion of families in the Experimental group (or Section 8 group, for the
Section 8-Control estimate) that relocate through the MTO program."
88 These across-group differences are calculated with regression adjustment for a series of
baseline survey characteristics such as household head race, age, educational attainment, and
employment status, as well as indicators for prerandom assignment arrests. Because of random
assignment, regression adjustment for these characteristics has little effect on the point estimates
for the across-group differences but helps improve the precision of our estimates (that is, reduce
the standard errors) by accounting for residual variation in the outcome measures of interest. We
calculate robust standard errors that are adjusted for the clustering of adult and youth partici-
pants within the same households. The estimates also use weights to account for changes in the
random assignment probabilities over time during the course of the MTO demonstration.
89 See Howard Bloom, Accounting for No-Shows in Experimental Design, 8 Evaluation
Rev 225, 225-46 (April 1984). The TOT estimate will be an unbiased estimate of the effects of
treatment on the treated if random assignment is truly random, and if assignment to the treat-
ment group has no effect on those who do not move through MTO. This second assumption may
not be literally true, because the counseling services and search assistance offered to treatment
families may influence later mobility patterns or other youth behaviors even among families that
do not relocate through MTO. The disappointment of searching but failing to find an apartment
may also affect nonmovers in the treatment groups. If the effects of treatment-group assignment
are substantially smaller for those who do not move through MTO compared to those who do,
our TOT estimates will approximate the effects of MTO moves on those who move through the
MTO program. Mechanically, we calculate TOT estimates using two-stage least squares where
we use indicators for random assignment outcomes as instruments for indicators for MTO
treatment take-up.
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TABLE 6
Effects of MTO Random Assignment on Arrests of Youth and Adults
E-C E-C S8-C S8-C
Controls ITf TOT ITT TOT
All crimes
All 1.123 0.031 0.072 0.015 0.027
[0.053] [0.120] [0.060] [0.104]
Females 0.759 -0.049 -0.111 -0.036 -0.062
[0.047] [0.107] [0.0511 [0.089]
Males 1.994 0.225 0.513 0.136 0.237
[0.131] [0.298] [0.1471 [0.2561
Violent crimes
All 0.322 -0.017 -0.039 -0.001 -0.002
[0.017] [0.040] [0.0221 [0.0381
Females 0.759 -0.024 -0.055 -0.029 -0.051
[0.016] [0.035] [0.018] [0.031]
Males 1.994 0 0 0.063 0.109
[0.0421 [0.0961 [0.054] [0.0941
Property crimes
All 0.329 0.056 0.128 0.031 0.054
[0.026] [0.060] [0.027] [0.048]
Females 0.257 0.025 0.057 0.016 0.028
[0.030] [0.068] [0.030] [0.0521
Males 0.502 0.131 0.3 0.066 0.115
[0.050] [0.1151 [0.052] [0.091]
Drug crimes
All 0.26 0 0 -0.024 -0.041
[0.024] [0.055] [0.025] [0.044]
Females 0.136 -0.032 -0.073 -0.018 -0.031
[0.020] [0.045] [0.0221 [0.037]
Males 0.558 0.077 0.176 -0.036 -0.062
[0.0631 [0.1431 [0.065] [0.1131
Other crimes
All 0.212 -0.008 -0.018 0.009 0.016
[0.0161 [0.036] [0.018] [0.031]
Females 0.136 -0.018 -0.041 -0.005 -0.009
[0.014] [0.032] [0.015] [0.026]
Males 0.394 0.016 0.037 0.043 0.075
[0.0391 [0.090 [0.0481 [0.083]
Source: Ludwig and Kling (2005). NOTES: Sample consists of 2,731 males and 6,402 females,
which reflects a pooled sample of youth, ages fifteen to twenty-five years old at the end of 2001,
plus MTO adults. The gender disparity in the sample arises because most MTO households are
headed by a single female, and so there are far more female than male adults in the sample. The
youth sample is gender balanced. Standard errors are in brackets.
The second row shows that for females the effects on arrests of
assignment to the Experimental or Section 8 rather than the Control
group are negative but not statistically significant, while for males the
across-group differences are positive and not quite significant at the
conventional cut-off level. The remaining panels of Table 6 disaggre-
gate the results by crime type. For females, the treatment-control
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group differences in arrests are negative (albeit not significant) for
violent, drug and other crimes, but not for property crimes. Males as-
signed to the Experimental group experience more property-crime
arrests than do those assigned to the Control group.
Heterogeneity in people's responses to moving to a less disor-
derly, less disadvantaged neighborhood arises with respect to age as
well as gender. Figure 3 below from Ludwig and Kling (2005) shows
average arrest rates for MTO participants in each of the three MTO
groups by age at the end of 2001, where each panel shows results
separately by crime type and gender. These results come from revising
the intent-to-treat estimates with an interaction between the treat-
ment indicator variables and a cubic polynomial in age, and then pre-
senting the predicted values of arrests-by-age for each group implied by
the parameter estimates. The eight panels of Figure 3 taken together
suggest that on balance moving to a less disadvantaged, less disorderly
neighborhood has more beneficial (or less detrimental) effects on
younger compared to older MTO participants9 In national data most
crime seems to be committed by adults, even though offending rates per
year are higher for teens,9' so the detrimental effects on adults are not as
encouraging as one might like from a policy perspective.
90 One concern with these results stems from the use of official arrest data, which capture
the combined effects of the behavior of both MTO participants and local criminal justice agen-
cies. Variation in the probability of arrest (P) across neighborhoods will affect the likelihood that
a criminal event (C) results in arrest (A), with A = P x C. Above we showed that compared to
adults assigned to the Control group, those in the Experimental or Section 8 group report that
local police are more responsive to calls for service. If responsiveness of police to 911 calls is
positively correlated with the probability of arrest, so that the probability of arrest is higher in
more affluent areas, then our analysis of arrest data may understate any effects of the MTO
Experimental and Section 8 treatments that reduce criminal behavior and overstate any effects
that lead to an increase in criminal offending.
91 For example, in 1998, 81.3 percent of all people arrested in the United States for any
crime were aged eighteen or older at the time; the figures for violent and property crime equal
82.8 and 65.2 percent, respectively. See United States Department of Justice and Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States: 1997 232-33 (GPO 1998), online at
http://www.fbi.govlucr/Cius-97/97crime/97crime4.pdf (visited Jan 19, 2006) (reporting the num-
ber and rates of arrests by region). For evidence of differential offending rates by age, see Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3
MTO Treatment Effects on Lifetime Arrests
by Age and Gender-Males
C: Property Crime, MTO Males
B: Violent Crime, MTO Males




D: Other Crimes, MTO Males
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FIGURE 3 (continued)
MTO Treatment Effects on Lifetime
Arrests by Age and Gender-Females
E: All Crimes, MTO Females
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G: Property Crime. MTO Females
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F: Violent Crime, MTO Females




H: Other Crimes, MTO Females




Additional evidence to suggest that moving to a less disorderly,
less disadvantaged community does not on net reduce criminal behav-
ior comes from the self-reported survey data collected for program
participants. Survey data on youth reveal no statistically significant
differences across groups (for either males or females) in self-reported
arrests or delinquency, and an increase in self-reported problem behav-
iors among males in the Experimental compared to the Control group.2
92 See Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 128 Q J Econ at 116-17 (cited in note 19). Comparing the
control group's mean self-reported arrest rate with what is implied by the administrative records
suggest that the former are susceptible to considerable underreporting. Whether this is also true
for the behavior problems index, which reveals a positive Experimental-Control difference for
male youth, is not clear. Of course, misreporting would have to be systematically different across
groups in order to affect the estimate for across-group differences in behavior problems.
U.~
8.
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The sharp gender difference in youth responses to moving to a
less disorderly, less disadvantaged neighborhood do not appear to be
driven by different responses by males and females to the stress and
disruption of moving per se, in part because in the first few years after
random assignment experimental males experience fewer violent-
crime arrests compared to controls." The gender difference in ef-
fects-also found in recent MTO research on education, substance
use, mental health, and physical health4 -seems to reflect differences
in how males and females respond to similar neighborhoods. Boys and
girls in the same randomly assigned treatment groups move into simi-
lar types of neighborhoods, and within families, brothers and sisters
respond differentially to the same mobility patterns.9
Note that one complication for interpretation of these results
comes from the fact that the MTO analysis relies on administrative ar-
93 Previous studies of the Baltimore, Boston, and New York sites that use the exogenous
variation in neighborhoods induced by MTO within individual demonstration sites on balance
yield evidence consistent with the view that moving to less distressed communities reduces anti-
social behavior by youth, at least in the short run (one to three years from random assignment).
In the Boston site, boys in the Experimental and Section 8 groups exhibit about one-third fewer
problem behaviors compared to controls in the short run. See Lawrence F Katz, Jeffrey R. Kling,
and Jeffrey B. Liebman, Moving to Opportunity in Boston: Early Results of a Randomized Mobil-
ity Experiment, 116 Q J Econ 607, 649 (2001) (offering statistical data illustrating the short-run
impacts of MTO on measures of child health and behavior problems). For the Baltimore site,
official arrest data suggest that teens in both treatment groups are less likely than controls to be
arrested for violent crimes. These short-run impacts are large for both boys and girls, but not
statistically significant when disaggregated by gender. See Jens Ludwig, Greg J. Duncan, and Paul
Hirschfield, Urban Poverty and Juvenile Crime: Evidence from a Randomized Housing-Mobility
Experiment, 116 Q J Econ 655, 671 (2001) (offering statistical data illustrating that "the results
are similar when we stratify the sample by gender, although the experimental-treatment effects
for girls are smaller both in absolute and proportional terms than those for boys"). Short-term
survey data from the New York site reveal no statistically significant differences across groups in
teen delinquency or substance use. See Tama Leventhal and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Moving to
Opportunity: An Experimental Study of Neighborhood Effects on Mental Health, 93 Am J Pub
Health 1576, 1579 (2003) (focusing on the short-term impact of the MTO program in New York
City). Five-year data for MTO reveal that there were short-term declines in violent criminal
offending for males in the Experimental versus Control groups in every site except for New
York, which then dissipated over time, which suggests that changes over time in the effects of
neighborhood mobility, rather than idiosyncrasies of the Boston or Baltimore sites, is the way to
reconcile the short-term and medium-term results from MTO.
94 See Jeffrey R. Kling and Jeffrey B. Liebman, Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood
Effects on Youth 39 (Kennedy School of Government Working Paper RWP04-034, Aug 2004),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=600596 (visited Jan 19, 2006) ("In
sum, we reject the hypothesis that neighborhoods had only limited effects on these youth. We
have identified some important beneficial effects of moving out of high poverty neighborhoods
on the outcomes of female teenage youth, and we have established that similar benefits did not
accrues to males.").
95 See Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 120 Q J Econ at 116 (cited in note 19) (finding that al-
though females participating in MTO experienced a large reduction in lifetime violent and prop-
erty crime arrests, men participating in the program experienced a proportionally smaller reduc-
tion in such arrests).
The University of Chicago Law Review
rest data, and so in principle may confound variation across neighbor-
hoods in criminal activity with variation in the propensity of police to
make arrests or victims to report crimes to police. One (admittedly
imperfect) test of this possibility comes from focusing on just the most
serious crimes, which will presumably be most likely to be reported to
police by victims and to result in arrest when a suspect is identified.
When we replicate our results using just violent crimes excluding as-
saults (most of which are simple assaults for which there may be non-
trivial variation across areas in victim reporting and police propensity
to arrest rather than warn suspects), we obtain qualitatively similar
findings to those reported above, with a full-sample Experimental-
Control difference equal to about 1.5 percent of the Control group's
mean arrest rate and a standard error of 12 percent of the Control mean.
The findings from MTO suggest either that declines in commu-
nity disorder do not translate into reductions in individual criminal
behavior or, at the very least, that any effects on criminal activity from
less disorder are outweighed by the countervailing effects from in-
creased neighborhood socioeconomic status.16 These results would
seem to suggest that any policy intervention that reduces disorder may
not reduce people's criminal behavior if such changes are also accom-
panied by gentrification that alters the composition of neighborhoods
in a fashion analogous to what the Experimental or Section 8 families
experience in MTO.
CONCLUSION
When Wilson and Kelling proposed the theory of broken win-
dows in the early 1980s many academic researchers were skeptical
about the ability of police activities to reduce crime. But since that
time, a new body of empirical literature has, in our view convincingly,
demonstrated that increased police spending does indeed reduce
crime,97 and that targeting police resources against the highest-crime
"hot spots" can also help prevent criminal activity." Outside of per-
96 One candidate explanation for the possibility of such countervailing effects is the possi-
bility that moving to a more affluent community reduces people's relative social standing within
the community. Erzo Luttmer has demonstrated that having lower relative earnings compared to
one's neighbors reduces happiness holding one's own income constant, which could in principle
translate into increased antisocial behavior. See generally Erzo ER Luttmer, Neighbors as Nega-
tives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being (NBER Working Paper 10667, Aug 2004), online at
http://www.nber.org/papers/W10667 (visited Jan 19,2006).
97 See Levitt, 18 J Econ Perspectives at 177 (cited in note 59).
98 See Lawrence W. Sherman, Fair and Effective Policing, in James Q. Wilson and Joan
Petersilia, eds, Crime: Public Policies for Crime Control 383, 389 (Institute for Contemporary
Studies 2002) (describing a policing strategy centered on applying increased police presence to
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haps a few remaining university sociology departments and some
Berkeley coffee shops, the notion that "police matter" is (or at least
should be) widely accepted. The key scientific and policy question be-
hind the Kelling and Sousa analysis is thus whether asking police to
focus on minor disorder crimes, as in broken windows policing, yields
more pronounced reductions in violent crime than does having police
focus on violent crimes directly. Our analysis provides no empirical
evidence to support the view that shifting police towards minor disor-
der offenses would improve the efficiency of police spending and re-
duce violent crime.
We have set out in this Article, not only to assess the best avail-
able evidence for the broken windows theory-George Kelling and
William Sousa's 2001 study-but also to rethink the research design
most appropriate to studying the broken windows hypothesis. We
demonstrate that the pattern of crime changes across New York City
precincts during the 1990s that Kelling and Sousa attribute to broken
windows policing is equally consistent with mean reversion: those pre-
cincts that received the most intensive broken windows policing are
the ones with the largest increases and levels of crime during the city's
crack epidemic. Consistent with findings elsewhere from city-level
data," jurisdictions with the greatest increases in crime during this pe-
riod tend to experience the largest subsequent declines as well. The
data from the MTO experiment reveal that moving to a less disor-
derly, less disadvantaged community on balance does not appear to
reduce criminal behavior among the MTO program population. If
disorder does affect crime, any such effects are small enough to be
dominated by whatever pernicious effects on people's criminal behav-
ior may arise from increases in neighborhood socioeconomic status, as
would be expected to occur to some degree in normal circumstances
as neighborhoods with declines in disorder begin to gentrify.
When asked in January 2004 whether the broken windows theory
had ever been empirically verified, James Q. Wilson reportedly told
the New York Times: "People have not understood that this was a
speculation."' ° The theory was not based on empirical data, Wilson
emphasized. "We made an assumption that a deteriorating quality of
life caused the crime rate to go up. ' O' As to whether that assumption is
right, Wilson stated: "I still to this day do not know if improving order
randomly selected hot spot intersections in Minneapolis, which decreased all reported crime by
about 13 percent).
99 See Raphael and Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements at 265 (cited in note 16).
100 Dan Hurley, Scientists at Work-Fenton Earls; On Crime as Science (a Neighbor at a
Time), NY Times F1 (Jan 6,2004).
101 Patricia Cohen, Oops, Sorry: Seems that My Pie Chart is Half-Baked, NY Times B7 (Apr
8,2000).
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will or will not reduce crime..'.. As Wilson noted in a different inter-
view, "God knows what the truth is."" 3
Yet understanding the ability of a broken windows policy to af-
fect disorder and crime is important for both legal and scientific pur-
poses. The notion that broken windows policing might reduce crime is
plausible because many of the behavioral mechanisms underlying this
policing strategy are at least in principle consistent with existing mod-
els of social contagion' Since the Almighty has so far resisted the
temptation to publish in scholarly journals, our results help answer
Wilson's question in the interim. Our bottom line is that there appears
to be no good evidence that broken windows policing reduces crime,
nor evidence that changing the desired intermediate output of broken
windows policing- disorder itself-is sufficient to affect changes in
criminal behavior.
102 Hurley, Scientists at Work, NY Times at F1 (cited in note 100).
103 Cohen, Oops, Sorry, NY Times at B7 (cited in note 101).
104 See, for example, Cook and Goss, A Selective Review of the Social-Contagion Literature
at 3-4 (cited in note 36).
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APPENDIX: NEW YORK CITY DATA
As noted earlier, Kelling and Sousa refused to share their data
with us. Fortunately we have been able to obtain the same New York
City Police Department (NYPD) crime and arrest data used by Kel-
ling and Sousa as their key dependent and explanatory variables. To
measure broken windows policing, KS used precinct-level reports of
total misdemeanor arrests. To measure violent crime, KS used pre-
cinct-level reports of four violent offenses (murder, rape, felonious
assault, and robbery). In all cases, KS used data from 1989 to 1998. We
have these data from 1989 through 2000, and so have the option of
examining whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of addi-
tional years worth of precinct-level information. We also have pre-
cinct-level reports for other types of crime, including property of-
fenses, which enables us to explore the pattern of broken windows
policing effects across crime types.
One challenge for the KS study, and for ours as well, is that data
on important potential confounding factors are not readily available
for New York City at the precinct level. To proxy the effect of the
crack epidemic, they use borough-level reports of hospital discharges
for cocaine-related episodes. To proxy the number of young males, KS
uses precinct-level school enrollment data. To measure unemploy-
ment, they use borough-level gross unemployment data. Whether data
measured at the level of New York's five boroughs adequately cap-
tures variation in social and policy conditions across the city's seventy-
six separate precincts is an open question. Moreover, the hospital dis-
charge data by its nature cannot distinguish between the prevalence of
crack use and powdered cocaine consumption. The standard concern
in the case of poorly measured explanatory variables is attenuation-
bias towards zero in the coefficients for these covariates. Some evi-
dence for this concern comes from the fact that the control variables
for young males and borough cocaine consumption used by Kelling
and Sousa have limited explanatory power in their model."'
We have also obtained the measures used by KS to capture varia-
tion across precincts in the drug problem and economic conditions.
Specifically, we have obtained borough-level data on the number of
unemployed people from the New York State Department of Labor.
We have also obtained data on hospital discharges for drug-related
causes from the New York State Department of Health, Bureau of
Biometrics.
105 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter? at 9 (cited in note 6).
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In addition, however, we attempt to improve upon the KS dataset in
part by incorporating census tract-level measures of sociodemographic
characteristics, taken from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses. (Data
for the intercensal years are linearly interpolated.) Because census
tract and police precinct boundaries do not perfectly overlap in New
York City, we have geocoded both tract and precinct boundaries, and
then aggregated tracts up to the precinct level by assuming that the
population of tracts that cross precinct boundaries are distributed
across precincts proportionately to the tract's land area.'1 We use
these census data to calculate measures of each precinct's age distribu-
tion, poverty rate, female-headed households, fraction of adults with
different levels of educational attainment, median income, and welfare
receipt. To measure physical signs of disorder we also control for the
fraction of housing units in the precinct that are vacant. Put differ-
ently, compared to the data used by Kelling and Sousa, our dataset
includes a much richer set of sociodemographic covariates measured
at the precinct level rather than some much larger unit of analysis.
Finally, we also incorporate into our dataset a measure of the
number of police officers assigned to each precinct in each year by the
NYPD. One important conceptual concern with the KS study is
whether its key explanatory variable of interest-the misdemeanor
arrest rate-captures the effects of changes in how police resources
are deployed or instead simply reflects increased police presence. This
counterexplanation for the KS findings is of some concern because, as
Kelling and Sousa note, from 1994 to 1999 the size of the NYPD force
increased by about one-third.'07
Descriptive statistics from our dataset on the key dependent and
explanatory variables closely match those reported by KS and by
Sousa's doctoral dissertation. For example, in Sousa's Table 5-2, the
mean number of misdemeanor arrests per precinct for the 1989-1998
period is 2,247, with a standard deviation of 1,968; in our dataset the
mean is equal to 2,245 with a standard deviation of 1,958. Appendix
Table 1 repeats this comparison for 1989, 1993, and 1998, and again
shows that our figures and theirs are quite close.
106 Suppose for example that census tract 1 lies entirely within precinct A, tract 2 lies en-
tirely within precinct B, but 25 percent of the land area of tract 3 is in precinct A while 75 percent
of the land area of tract 3 is within precinct B. Let X, be some population characteristic for tract
(i), such as percent poor, and let Pi represent the population of tract (i). In this case we calculate
percent population poor in precinct A as (PxX+(0.25)PXX 3)/(P,+(0.25)P3).
107 See Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter? at 19 (cited in note 6).
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
Average Misdemeanor Arrests per Precinct, Selected Years
1989 1993 1998
Harcourt-
Ludwig dataset 1,754 1,795 3,034
Kelling-Sousa 1,811 1,779 3,034
dataset 1,811 1,779 3,034
Notes: The Kelling-Sousa figures are taken from Table 2 of their Manhattan Institute report.
These figures are mean number of misdemeanor arrests per precinct, calculated without weight-
ing by precinct population.
Finally, while KS does not report the mean violent crime rate for
their dataset over the entire 1989-1998 period (the sum of murder,
rape, robbery, and felonious assault), their Figure 1A reports the total
number of violent crimes for New York City as a whole by year. In our
dataset these figures equal 144,375 in 1989, 131,310 in 1993, 97,170 in
1995, and 70,725 in 1998. Each of these numbers, and the overall trend
shown in the top panel of our Appendix Figure 1, match closely the
numbers represented in their Figure 1A.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1
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